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THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW, by Winfred Overholser. Har-

court, Brace and Co., New York, 1953. Pp. 147. $3.50.
It is common knowledge that contemporary interdependences have increasingly led lawyers and psychiatrists to an
awareness of a community of legal-psychiatric interest.'

It is equally common knowledge that the awareness in question has often been too insecure to sustain a meaningful and productive collaboration and that hence, forensic psychiatry, as a
product of legal-psychiatric collaboration, has been handicapped. 2
The accepted institutional model of forensic psychiatry has
thus been molded, at least in part, by the dominant patterns of
intercommunication between lawyers and psychiatrists. Contemporary forensic psychiatry has therefore progressed in direct
proportion to the contemporary pace of the rapprochement between the legal and psychiatric professions, i.e., at snail's pace,
though significantly without standstill. The Psychiatrist and the
Law has been written in quest of a foundation for inter-professional harmony. It falls far short of such an ambitious goal. However, it proves its effectiveness along more modest lines. Thus,
at its best, it performs a valuable missionary task for the "law"
and "psychiatry" in highlighting validly isolated problem areas
of defective inter-professional communication which disturb the
sound, institutional growth of forensic psychiatry. Beyond this,
it must be welcomed as a further impetus to the trend of a widening popular demand for the rational reappraisal of the contemporary institutional practice. It cannot, however, with the best of
possible good will in the world be said to make a definitive contribution to the advancement of the sought-for understanding between the "law" and "psychiatry" on its own merit. The significant
data presented are not novel. The meaning of the data appears too
frequently misunderstood or misinterpreted. It is not altogether
1. See generally,
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surprising in this connection that the psychiatrist should blunder
largely within legal doctrine as the lawyer has so often blundered
within the concepts utilized by psychiatry. Both the lawyer and
the psychiatrist should be criticized under such circumstances,
not for transcending the traditional bounds of their respective
expertise, but instead, for failing to delve into each other's experience in sufficient depth to achieve the necessary accuracy for
a valid three-dimensional legal-psychiatric evaluation of the "is"
and "ought."
Comment by the lawyer upon'psychiatry and by the psychiatrist upon law is to be welcomed, with the proviso that it be
based on more than a cursory or superficial understanding, i.e.,
that it be preceded by an elementary but systematic inter-disciplinary integration of law and psychiatry from the respective
perspectives of the lawyer and of the psychiatrist. This in no way
presupposes a medical school education for lawyers, or a law
school education for psychiatrists. 8
The Psychiatrist and the Law constitutes a compilation of
lectures delivered by Dr. Winfred Overholser as the recipient of
the 1952 Isaac Ray Award, conferred annually by the American
Psychiatric Association, upon the individual adjudged as "most
worthy by reason of his contribution to the improvement of the
relations of Law and Psychiatry. '4 The advice of Mr. Justice
Felix Frankfurter, Judge Justin L. Miller and Professor Sheldon
Glueck is acknowledged by the author as having "greatly aided"
the preparation of his lectures, and hence, the preparation of the
book itself.5
The first lecture is devoted to tracing the history of modern
psychiatric thought, a summary of contemporary concepts of the
"make-up of personality"" and personality development, as well
as a "brief statement concerning the general classification of
mental disorders."'7 Here the author is at his best, and his best is
the most concise and readable survey of a psychoanalytically
viewed "substance of psychiatry" encountered by this reviewer.
It is probably the best introduction of this length (36 pages)
available to lawyers and law students in this field at this time.
3. For a persuasive proposal of necessary changes in educational patterns
from legal perspectives see Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and
Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203
(1943). See also FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949).
4. OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW ix (1953).

5. Id. at x.
6. Id.

at 11.

7. Id. at 25.
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From here on in, the author steps upon uncertain ground.
His second lecture, devoted to the exploration of differences of
viewpoint between "law" and "psychiatry," fails to come to grips
with the real problems on any but the most superficial basis.
His attack upon the prevailing standard of legal responsibility
proceeds upon the oft-repeated theory that the M'Naghten Rules
reflect an antiquated conception of human personality in terms
of a rigid compartmentalization of the recognized areas of mental
functioning. A test based on the "awareness" of the nature and
quality of the act is thus stigmatized as inadequate in presenting an exclusively intellectual criterion of cognition, derived from
an age ignorant of the interaction of all areas of mental functioning: "One of the fundamental assumptions of the law is that
most acts are done on a basis of reasoning."'8 Such criticism falls
wide of the mark. A misdirected volley permits existing defects,
admittedly discoverable in our system of legal responsibility, to
escape unscathed. The misconception underlying such psychiatric
attacks has long been laid bare, although it continues to raise
"some differences of viewpoint" where none appear to exist.
Rebuttal of such misguided arguments has come from both legal
and psychiatric quarters and deserves restatement. Thus, the lawyers have invited psychiatric attention to the fact that the law
under attack embodies, of necessity, an essentially socio-political
as distinct from a medical standard:
"The dissatisfaction of psychiatrists and social workers
brought into contact with the criminal law is... a by-product
of an issue which cannot be adequately represented as a
mere discrepancy between eighteenth century legal-psychological dogma and modern conceptions of psychology and
psychiatry. Those who appear to have assumed that it could
be, have proceeded upon a curiously superficial understanding
of the meaning and function of the legal formulae of responsibility and of intent . . . inherited though they are from the
Common Law of a more primitive day. For the law is not,
and never was, designed as a treatise on psychology or any
of the social sciences. Its formulae, while couched in terms
8. Id. at 41. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1120 (1909): "An act done by a
person who is an idiot, imbecile, lunatic or insane is not a crime. . . . A
person is not excused from criminal liability as an idiot, imbecile, lunatic or
insane person, except upon proof that, at the time of committing the alleged
criminal act, he was laboring under such a defect of reason as: 1. Not to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or 2. Not to know
that the act was wrong." Cf. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 4 How. St.
Tr. (N.S.) 847 (H.L. 1843).
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of outmoded psychological concepts, reflect an underlying
social policy with respect to the disposition of offenders and
the degree of collective responsibility toward the underprivileged and maladjusted which American communities are
accustomed to assume, and which appears to be by no means
as outmoded as the concepts in which it is expressed .... The
psychiatrist may be able to describe a given offender. He
may shed considerable light on the factors which conditioned
his development and present state. It is within his province to
indicate to what extent the offender may prove amenable to
treatment .... But there existing science stops. What varieties of personality the community shall take the trouble to
maintain even though they have demonstrated their inability
to get along with the group, what individuals it shall undertake to rehabilitate at public expense . . . are primarily
questions of social values and of politics. .
They have long noted "that no reason exists why courtroom
infiltration of psychological knowledge should not result in expanding the concept of awareness or knowledge of the M'Naghten
Rules to embrace both that of the emotional as well as of the
intellectual variety, without benefit of statutory change."'
Psychiatrists, in turn, have repeatedly demonstrated the
possible compatibility of contemporary psychiatric theory and
contemporary legal doctrine. A classic summary of this concept
of coexistence has declared:
"The question asked of us is monotonously the same:
Did the defendant know the nature and quality of the act
and if he did, did he know that it was wrong. The crux of
the question revolves around the word 'know'. . . . What
makes it possible for a civilized, mentally healthy human
being to resist a murderous impulse is not the cold detached
reasoning that it is wrong and dangerous but the automatic
emotional, mostly unconscious, identification with the prospective victim, an identification which automatically inhibits
the impulse to kill and causes anxiety. . . .What must be
emphasized here is that we should take cognizance of the
9. Dession, Psychiatry and the Conditioning of Criminal Justice, 47 YALE

L.J. 319, 331-32 (1938). Cf. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 477-538
(1947). For a recent statement of the law of insanity in traditional legal
terms, see Comment, 27 So. CALIF. L. REV. 181 (1954).
10. Killian & Arens, Use of Psychiatry in Soviet Criminal Proceedings,
41 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 136, 142 et seq. (1950).
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 477-58 (1947).

See also HALL, GENERAL
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fact that understanding is not a purely intellectual process
and that the word 'know' as it is used in the phrasing of the
criminal law dealing with insanity is now used by psychiatrists in a sense totally different from that used a hundred
or more years ago, that the meaning of the word 'know' was
changed not suddenly but gradually, not by the arbitrary
fantasies of psychiatrists but by invincible pressure of newly
discovered facts about the working of the human psychic
apparatus. How can we have one conception of knowledge
when examining our patients and another as soon as we are
sworn in at the witness stand? The incongruity, we are all
inclined to contend, is the fault of the law. I think this is
not the case; the incongruity is caused by the lack of clarity
as to standards within the medical profession itself. It is
doubtful whether an enlightened judge would be able to
oppose the psychiatrist if he insists that he cannot take the
word 'know' for granted any more than he can the word
'responsibility'. . . . The psychiatrist . . .will feel on much
more solid ground ... if he carries with him his strict clinical
standard directly to the witness stand."" (Italics supplied.)
Dr. Overholser's exposition of "Some Differences of Viewpoint" makes no attempt to deal with this growing body of
refutation of his primary assumptions.
It appears, in fact, as though he were chronically disabled
by semantic rigidity from meeting with the lawyer upon common
ground in this area of discussion. Unable to resolve the "complex"
concerning "awareness" or "understanding" in the sense of the
law of responsibility he is incapacitated from proceeding to a
11. Zilboorg, Misconceptions of Legal Insanity, 9 AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY

540, 552-53 (1939).
The lawyer's acceptance

HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES

of this psychiatric perspective is shown by

OF CRIMINAL LAW 486-88

(1947):

"The severe crit-

icism of the criminal law by various psychiatrists has spread the illusion
that the chief difficulty . . . in the way of adequate adjudication is a
traditional legal indifference to Science. But the plain fact is that the chief
limitation on any solution of the problems arising from mental disease
is the lack of medical and psychiatric knowledge of mental disease....
"Closely related to the above are certain aspects of the language problem,
especially the frequent criticism by psychiatrists of legal terminology....
"The sophistry of such criticism is indicated in the prevailing practices
of numerous psychiatrists who have participated in the trial of insanity cases
for a great many years. They have regularly 'translated' the legal terms
into the language of their discipline..."
For an early pre-psychoanalytic example of judicial flexibility in the
construction of a necessary testamentary "awareness" of both emotional
and intellectual proportions, in accord with contemporary psychoanalytic
knowledge, see Delafield v. Parish, 25 N.Y. 9 (1862).
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further and much needed inquiry into the effect of the existing
law upon the shaping of individual and social "conscience." To
the enlightened contemporary social scientist "there is no innate
form of responsibility. Every society consistently trains for or
at least carefully prepares the individual for the assumption of
responsibilities. 1 2 What is the effect, then, of, e.g., the M'Naghten Rules on the training or preparation for individual responsibility conducive to democratic social order? Only an adequate
empirical investigation on an inter-disciplinary basis is capable
of providing any meaningful answer. Dr. Overholser's incapacity
in reaching common ground with the lawyer in verbal interpretation blocks his effective participation in such a task.
In the absence of significant scientific contributions in this
area of investigation, 18 Dr. Overholser's failure in this regard
must be felt as a keen loss by both lawyers and psychiatrists.
His consequent suggestions for legal change, whether it be
in the area of responsibility for crime or contractual or testamentary capacity, etc., etc., cannot, therefore, be seriously considered
upon the basis of the argument which he presents. He has not
14
come to grips with any of the deeper issues.
His advocacy of "truly indeterminate sentences with adequate court clinics and with psychiatric services in correctional
institutions"'1 for all cases involving emotional instability represents traditional psychiatric preference today, without, how12. MANNHEIM, FREEDOM, POWER AND DEMOCRATIC PLANNING 207 (1950).
The problem, of course, is twofold. One is the effect of the law in the task
of the repression of the "criminal" impulses of the "non-criminal" masses

in the absence of adequate media of mass therapy; the other is the effect
of the law as a part of the social scene upon the formation of the superego.
Cf. BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE (1934).

13. An oversimplified analysis of the function of "punishment" in "conscience-formation" has tended to highlight the problem still awaiting solution, without providing any valid answer of consequence. See De Grazia,
Crime Without Punishment: A Psychiatric Conundrum, 52 COL. L. REV.
746, 756 (1952):
"The association of wrong with punishment is so strongly bred into the
individual from his cradle to his grave as to be conditioned. When a wrong
is committed we inevitably expect punishment. Prior to the formation of
the superego, the child's wrongs are met with punishment, i.e.,
either the
infliction of physical pain or withdrawal of love by the parents. It is this
very process of punishment which is the basis for the later formation of the
superego

through identification

with the parents. The introjection of the

parental prohibitions results in superego formation, so that commission of a
wrong, thereafter, creates feelings of guilt and expectation of punishment."
Cf. WEST, CONSCIENCE AND SOCIETY (1951).
14. A more careful study as a guide to policy formulation is exemplified

by Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major
Premise, 53 YALE L.J. 271 (1944).
15. OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW 51 (1953).
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ever, any showing of awareness of the profound problems of
political and civil rights implicit in the enlargement of customary
administrative psychiatric discretion, exemplified by a situation
which finds at least in theory, the psychiatrist "on top" instead
of "on tap," as perhaps in the case of the originally contemplated
administration of the new sex-offender laws in New York and
in Pennsylvania. 6
He is significantly more enlightening when he directs his
psychiatric skill to a more general analysis of law in terms of the
underlying motivations of legislators in a given field. Thus, he
furnishes a useful popular description of the passage of "sexual
psychopath" laws under the impetus of growing "public excitement" about the "sex fiend" and the demand "to do something"
about him in the absence of any significant increase in the rate
of sex crime. 1 7 He could usefully have gone on to an analysis of
the personality dynamisms within the body-politic bent upon the
intensification of legislative severity in the treatment of the sex
offender, but he contents himself with noting that "the wave of
sex crimes is mostly an 'apparition produced by . . . offended
dignity'" and that a "bogey has been raised" divorced from existing realities.' 8 Perhaps this is all that is called for-at least with
regard to the psychologically enlightened audience. He may well
have been justified in assuming, if he did, that the state of mind
of a civic 6lite productive of such fantasies and ensuing panic reactions, is too obvious to require explicit psychiatric comment.
The author treads cautiously in mentioning in general terms
the "administrative ineffectiveness" of most "sexual psychopath"
laws "as they now stand."' 9 He explicitly lists the Pennsylvania
16. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 1944-a (1950), 2188 (1950), 2189-a (1950);

PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1166-1172 (Purdon, 1951).
One of the psychiatric progenitors of the New York statute has made

explicit acknowledgment of the uncertainty of adequate psychiatric care
under present conditions and has questioned the wisdom of the presently accepted legislative draft. See ABRAHAMSEN, WHO ARE THE GUILTY? 254 (1952):
"The success of such a law requires the largest possible psychiatric facilities

in order to implement it. It was originally suggested .. .that an institute for
criminal behavior be established where most of these . . . cases could be
treated, where psychiatric personnel could be trained and where further

research on delinquents, including sex-offenders, could take place. Unfortunately, these proposals were scrapped, which may seriously hamper the
success of the law."
17. OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW 48-49 (1953).

18. Id. at 49. Cf. Sutherland, The Sexual Psychopath Laws, 40 J. CRIM.

L. & CRIMINOLOGY 543 (1950). Bensing, A Comparative Study of American Sex
Statutes, 42 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 57 (1951). Consult also FREUD, THE
PROBLEM OF ANXIETY (1936).
19. OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW 51

(1953). Cf. Sutherland,
The Sexual Psychopath Laws, 40 J. ClM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 543 (1950).
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and New York laws as exceptions. 20 No further comment is
forthcoming. The New York law, -to take one example, provides
for the "truly indeterminate sentence" advocated by Dr. Overholser and appears, therefore, to enjoy his psychiatric approval
on that score, as well as beyond that, insofar as it is exempted
from his criticism of other "sexual psychopath" laws-notwithstanding the fact that it provides for such "therapy" as is available in state prisons.
In the light of contemporary knowledge it hardly needs stating that the record for the therapeutic rehabilitation of the sexoffender, presented by available modes of imprisonment, has been
less than distinguished. It is also widely accepted today that contemporary punitive attitudes in this field are countertherapeutic
in that they tend to the advancement, rather than the diminution
of existing deviations.

21

The author's third lecture attempts to cover the subject of
the mental patient and the hospital.
It is essentially a partisan appeal for legislation which would
provide the procedural apparatus capable of operating with
minimum publicity and maximum speed in the judicial commitment of the mentally ill person to the mental hospital. The author
validly draws upon his general clinical and his specifically forensic-psychiatric experience to inveigh against the hazards to
mental health of commitment by jury trial and the detention
of a patient in a jail pending the disposition of commitment
proceedings, a phenomenon still encountered in several of our
22
state jurisdictions.
He is patently eager to dispel the "myth" that "many sane
persons are improperly sent to mental hospitals and detained
there-the so-called 'railroading' myth" 2 -too eager, in fact.
This dismissal of this "myth" is peremptory. It is true that "rail20. OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW 51 (1953). See N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 1944-a (1950); PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1166-1172 (Purdon, 1951).
21. ABRAHAMSEN, WHO ARE THE GUILTY? 253-54 (1953); Wertham. A Psych-

atrist Looks at Psychiatry and the Law, 3 BUFF. L. REV. 41, 50 (1953). See also
DRUMMOND, THE SEX PARADOX (AN ANALYTICAL SURVEY OF SEX AND THE LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES TODAY) 144 (1953). Cf. Karpman, Psychosis as a Defense

Against Yielding to Perversive (Paraphliac) Sexual Crimes, 44 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 22 (1953).

22. OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW 77-78 (1953). A more "upto-date" pattern of legislation governing the commitment and custodial
care of the mentally ill is exemplified by the N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW
§§ 70-90.
23. OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW 80 (1953).
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roading" can for most cases be safely ruled out as attributable
to conscious psychiatric malice as a matter of both common
sense and general experience and does not, therefore, demand
detailed refutation in a book of this length. A "railroading," however, consisting not only of the improper commitment of the
"sane" person, but also of the infliction of medically contraindicated measures upon the "insane" after his commitment,
or the "therapeutic" incarceration of the "insane" without therapy-and attributable not to conscious psychiatric malice, but
rather to psychiatric negligence and/or incompetence and/or
indifference, cannot be dismissed in this cavalier fashion. 24 To
24. If it be assumed that "power corrupts and absolute power corrupts
absolutely," the inflation of psychiatric power as a result of legislative
failure to provide adequate "checks and balances" must give rise to serious
public concern. The ratio of a handful of reported malpractice suits against
psychiatrists as against the multiplicity of reported malpractice suits against
other medical practitioners cannot be adequately explained as attributable
to a disparity in numbers between psychiatrists and other medical practitioners, and/or the allegedly higher standards of psychiatric ethics. A more
probable inference is that, absent new and adequately certain and objective
legislative standards, psychiatric malpractice, however flagrant, is, by virtue
of its subjective characteristics, infinitely less susceptible to judicial proof
than the malpractice of other medical practitioners. See, e.g., Gasperini v.
Manginelli, 196 Misc. 547, 92 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Farber v. Olkon, 246
P.2d 710 (Cal. Civ. App. 1952). To assert that what amounts to a virtual immunization from effective judicial scrutiny of the psychiatric profession is
not productive of mischief is to assume a virtue among psychiatrists undiscoverable among other mortals. If, and only "if men were angels" should
effective legal restraints be safely abandoned as unnecessary-in the tradition
of the democratic social order.
It is noteworthy, for example, that courts have provided scant, if any,
relief against the existing abuse of electric shock "therapy." Psychiatrists,
administering such "treatment" without consent have not infrequently been
shielded by the assertion of an emergency as justification. See, e.g., Farber v.
Olkon, 146 P.2d 710 (Cal. Civ. App. 1952). Unduly high standards of proof
have kept too many patients from recovering for physical injuries sustained
in the course of electric shock "therapy." See, e.g., O'Rourke v. Halcyon Rest,
281 App. Div. 838, 118 N.Y.S.2d 693 (2d Dep't 1953).
Pre-frontal lobotomy operations exemplify another potential source of
violation of individual rights and appear to require particularly urgent restraint by effective legislation. It has thus been observed (Drummond, op. cit.
supra note 21, at 82, that the "need for adoption of legislation against promiscuous use of . . . [this] operation by public institutions to which court commitments are sent is fortified by the glaring fact that lobotomy could readily
be used as a satisfactory means of controlling obstreperous inmates who are
a nuisance to prison wardens and guards, which the emotionally and mentally
deranged admittedly are." The "voice of caution" suggests indeed that the
law interpose a "prior restraint" against the discretional psychiatric transformation of a man into a "human vegetable."
If psychiatrists, moreover, are to accept the democratic tradition as the
basis for legal-psychiatric collaboration it is high time for them to reexamine
their varying forms of custodial care and "therapy" in the light of the
standards furnished by the continuing Judicial expansion of existing concepts of punishment (or deprivation) which are subject to constitutionally
secured procedural safeguards. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163
U.S. 228 (1896); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942);
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943); United States v. Lovett,
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ignore this problem in its entirety appears tantamount to a confession of indifference to the traditional democratic values of a
free society-unless one were to proceed ab initio upon the
assumption of a dogma of psychiatric infallibility. Almost all, if
not all, lawyers in contemporary society will make short shrift of
any such assumption. There can be no doubt, therefore, that
psychiatrists will have to renounce any pretensions to such an
infallibility, and hence proceed to a recognition of the reality of
the lawyer's concern with "due process" if legal-psychiatric collaboration is to develop in this area. 25
Dr. Overholser may well deny the validity of such a warning
when applied to him and point to his general demand for the
observance of humanitarian standards of hospital care:
"Once the patient has been sent to the hospital, he is,
of course, entitled to the best available care, and there is a
responsibility on the part of the state to see to it that adequate personnel are provided to give him the care which he
20
needs.,
Such an explicit or implicit denial on his part, if it should
be deemed to exist, would come with bad grace against the background of contemporary psychiatric practice. The author maintains silence as to the duties of the psychiatrist in the absence of
"adequate facilities." The silence becomes meaningful in the
328 U.S. 303 (1946); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123 (1951).
See also Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court in Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949):
"Due process of law . . . conveys neither formal nor fixed nor narrow
requirements. It is the compendious expression for all those rights which
the courts must enforce because they are basic to our free society. But basic
rights do not become petrified as of any one time, even though, as a matter
of human experience, some may not too rhetorically be called eternal verities. It is of the very nature of a free society to advance in its standards
of what is deemed reasonable and right. Representing as it does a living
principle, due process is not confined within a permanent catalogue of what
may at a given time be deemed the limits or the essentials of fundamental
rights." (Italics supplied.)
25. That this cavalier dismissal of the problem of possible wrongful
commitment and kindred issues does not constitute an isolated phenomenon
In contemporary psychiatric thinking Is brought out by GUTTMACHER &
WEHOFEN. PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW (1952). Another well-known psychiatrist
with considerable experience in the field of forensic psychiatry has seen fit
to record this observation as his comment upon such an attitude. Wertham,
A Psychiatrist Looks at Psychiatry and the Law, 3 BUFF. L. REv. 41, 48
(1953): "Wrong commitments happen more often than the authors seem to
admit. I know of thousands of commitment papers made out after a few
minutes' examination. And I know state hospitals where patients have not
seen a doctor for two years."
26. OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW 97 (1953).
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light of the recent judicial decision featuring Dr. Overholser
as the defendant in an action brought against him as the superintendent of St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D. C., by
one of his patients confined to that hospital under the "sexual
psychopath" statute of the District of Columbia.27 The patient
had sued to regain his freedom upon habeas corpus. He had
introduced evidence at the hearing upon the petition that he was
confined in a place of confinement for the criminal insane "and
that he .. . [was] confined there with many wild and violent
insane persons .... [He had] testified without contradiction that
he had been assaulted by mentally deranged persons in shackles.
He [had] described noisome, unnatural and violent acts by inmates in ... [his] Hall." 28 (Italics supplied.)
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia had discharged the writ of habeas corpus and an appeal had
followed. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia had vindicated the petitioner-patient by a unanimous
reversal of the decision below. It remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings in accord with its appellate
opinion which declared:
"Both the intent and the terms of . . . [the 'sexual psychopath'] statute are for the commitment of these persons to a
hospital for remedial treatment. . . . [The individuals so
committed] are denominated 'patients'. . . . [The] facts which
petitioner asserts depict a place of confinement for the hopeless and the violent, not a place of remedial restriction. ...
The incarceration of this petitioner in a place maintained for
the confinement of the violent, criminal, hopeless insane, instead of in a place designed and operated for the treatment of
the mentally ill who are not insane, is not authorized by the
2' 9
statute.
Dr. Overliolser moves into safer and sounder terrain with
his last lecture on the subject of "The Psychiatrist as a Witness."
A valid summary of the history of the developing practice of
psychiatric courtroom expertise is followed by the largely misconceived allegation of existing prejudice against the psychiatric
witness. The allegation is founded, in part, upon the occasionally
careless judicial employment of medical language, solely designed, however, to serve as the equivalent of available legal
27. Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1953).

28. Id. at 418.
29. Id. at 418-19.
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terminology and in no way rationally determinable as signifying the judicial adoption or rejection of any particular medical
view. It is founded in equal measure upon the refusal of the
author to consider any interpretation other than that this loose
judicial employment of medical terminology involves a judicial
meddling with medicine. He would be less appalled at a judicial
statement that "considering insanity as a disease" should be
viewed as a "vicious principle"8 if he were prepared to concede
that the learned judge may have employed the term "insanity,"
not in any biological sense, but loosely, to signify nothing more
than the absence of responsibility in the legal sense. Dr. Overholser clearly is not one of the medical practitioners guilty of
the semantic sophistry attributed by Jerome Hall to numerous
psychiatrists who translate "the legal terms into the language
of their discipline," and conversely acquire the facility for translating the language of their discipline into legal language. 81
Beyond this Dr. Overholser registers a valid and much
needed objection against the widespread practice of permitting
82
any physician to testify as an expert in psychiatric matters;
he wisely commends the emerging practice of joint psychiatric
examination by the experts of the two adverse parties; 3 and he
accurately underscores the inherent rights of the courts to summon experts, independently, upon their own motion (ex mero
motu) .84
Here, as elsewhere, in urging a greater freedom from traditional restrictions for the psychiatrist, he seems unaware of the
underlying problems of civil liberties in a democratic state.85
30. OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW 109 (1953).

31. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 487 (1947). The high frequency of present psychiatric failure to grasp the full significance of semantics accounts for yet another block in the communication between lawyers
and psychiatrists. Psychiatrists, as a group, would do well to ponder once
again the elementary lessons of such a pioneering work as OGDEN &
RICHARDS,

THE MEANING

OF MEANING

(1923).

The contribution of semantic

sophistication to legal-psychological scholarship of a high order has been
recently exemplified by James & Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident
Law, 63 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1950).
32. OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW 110-119 (1953).
33. Id. at 117. Cf. N.Y. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. §§ 658, 662 et seq., 870-76
(ranging In years of effectuation from 1939 to 1953).
34. OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW 119 (1953). Cf. 9 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2484 (3d ed. 1940). An incisive comparative evaluation of this
problem has been presented in an as yet unpublished manuscript, "The Law
of Evidence in Civil and Common Law Systems," by Professor Arthur
Lenhoff, read at the Comparative Law Round-Table Conference of the AALS
Convention of 1953.
35. OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW 112-117 (1953). Cf. id. at
55-57. The psychiatric liberties allowed in United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp.
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Dr. Overholser concludes with a recommendation for the
abolition of capital punishment and the expression of hope for
the "development of mutual understanding between the representatives of law and psychiatry." 36
This reviewer, in turn, can but conclude with the hope that
the near future will see a psychiatric literary contribution which
is significantly more conducive to the "development of mutual
understanding between the representatives of law and psychiatry," than The Psychiatrist and the Law.
In the meantime he is prepared to welcome Dr. Overholser's
book to the none too overcrowded shelves of most law libraries in
this field.
Richard Arens*
LEARNING PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE,

by Alice Sturgis. McGraw-

Hill Book Co., New York, 1953. Pp. xvi, 358. $4.00.
There are numerous manuals on parliamentary law, but if
any of us should be asked to name one of them offhand, he
would most likely name Robert's Rules of Order,a book which, as
559 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), which have Dr. Overholser's apparent endorsement
have been interpreted as threatening to the liberties of free people by more
perceptive observers. See, e.g., Miller & Miller, Book Review, 20 U. OF Cmu. L.

REV. 598, 601-02 (1953):
"The psychiatric testimony of the experts called by the defense raised
issues about civil rights as disturbing as the problem of multiple jeopardy
involved In such trials. Hiss was one of the first victims of the 'new look' in
justice-admit your guilt before the investigating committee and the grand
jury, and become a hero; deny it, and face a perjury trial because the
statute of limitations has expired and you cannot be convicted for the act.
He also suffered from the recently modish procedure suggested by the
phrases 'forgery by typewriter,' 'trial by newspaper,' 'guilt by association.'
"But it was Chambers who became the victim of a moot point in the
administration of justice, when, in the second trial, Judge Goddard permitted
psychiatrists to testify as experts to discredit the credibility of his testimony. Although Chambers was not a party in the case and could get no
redress, his personality was given a most unsympathetic airing in open
court and the press. One wonders whether this precedent gives the witness
much more protection than he would have before some of the more blatant
congressional investigating circuses. Adding to the shakiness of the whole
episode is the fact that psychiatry has not yet reached the advanced level
of competence which would properly permit its practitioners to claim expertness In the field of political affairs. Psychopathic personalities are not
always liars, and the oversold field of psychiatry is not yet so advanced
that its adherents can tell when Chambers' testimony was fact and when
fable. Claims of ability to make such a distinction from observing the
behavior in court of a person who has not even been interviewed or examined could scarcely increase public esteem for modern phychiatry."
Cf. JowiT'r, THE STRANGE CASE OF ALGER Hiss 218-224 (1953).
36. OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAw 134 (1953).
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Buffalo; Member, District
of Columbia Bar.

